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BOOK REVIEWS 
From Cells to Souls-and Beyond: Changing Portraits of Human Nature, ed. 
Malcolm Jeeves. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2004. Pp. xiv, 252. $29.00 (paper); and A Materialist Metaphys-
ics of the Human Person, by Hud Hudson. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2001. Pp. xii, 202. $40.00. 
STEWART GOETZ, Ursinus College 
From Cells to Souls -and Beyond: Changing Portraits of Human Nature is a col-
lection of engaging essays about the nature of a human being. The authors 
of the essays are professionals in diverse disciplines, including anatomy 
and structural biology, biblical studies, genetics, neurology, philosophy, 
psychiatry, psychology, and systematic theology. Though the authors are 
from diverse disciplines, they are all professing Christians who are united 
by the belief that mind/soul-body substance dualism (dualism, for short) 
is false and that the human person is best thought of as a single entity 
(monism) with two kinds of properties, namely, mental/soulish and physi-
cal. Simply stated, "[t ]here is ... an irreducible duality ... , but it is not a 
duality that rightly calls for dualism" (p. 237). The contributors preferred 
way of explaining the existence of this duality of properties is in terms of 
emergence. In virtue of the increasing capacity and interactive complex-
ity of the lower level complex physical systems that comprise the human 
biological entity, mental properties with their causal powers emerge at 
a higher (highest) level. The result is the capacity for genuine top-down 
causation from our mental lives to our physical lives (pp. 63-66). 
Though the authors emphasize that their "nonreductive physicalism" 
(p. 64) makes mental-to-physical causation possible, they are equally em-
phatic that what recommends their view of the human person over the 
dualist's is the existence of intimate bottom-to-top causal links between 
what goes on in different regions of our brains and our mental lives. For 
example, the left of the two brain hemispheres is usually dominant for 
speech so that "[l]eft-sided brain lesions can cause a searching for words, a 
limitation of vocabulary, a shortening of sentences, or a jumble of meaning-
less words" (pp. 46-47). Early degeneration of neurons in the hippocam-
pus of the brain (located in the right and left temporal lobes of the cerebral 
cortex) results in disturbances in "working memory" where persons may 
have increasing difficulty either remembering where they placed items, 
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recalling the names of persons to whom they were recently introduced, 
"or following the narratives of stories they are reading or watching on 
television" (p. 87). Multiple sclerosis can produce fronto-temporal-limbi 
damage in the brain which results in an overflow of sadness, mirth, or 
despair (p. 45). With Alzheimer's disease, neurons die, small holes appear 
throughout brain tissue, and the cerebral cortex looks shriveled in CT 
scans of the brain. For Christians with Alzheimer's, the effect of the dis-
ease on their spiritual lives is typically devastating. A Presbyterian min-
ister, Robert Davis, reported that his spiritual life was miserable. Because 
his emotions were dead, he could not experience the comfort of his Savior 
(p. 89). "[T]he nature of the [causal] interdependence increasingly uncov-
ered by scientific research makes a substance dualism harder to maintain 
without tortuous and convoluted reasoning" (p. 240). 
Because the contributors are Christians and well aware that the Chris-
tian tradition has overwhelmingly sided with dualism, they are concerned 
about whether their view accords wIth the view of the human person 
found in Scripture. The consensus of the authors is that while Scripture 
does not engage in philosophical anthropology as such ("[T]he Bible's wit-
ness to the nature of human life is ... na"ive ... because it has not worked 
out in what we may regard as a philosophically satisfying way the na-
ture of physical existence in life, death, and afterlife" (p. 194)), what can 
be gleaned from it is more than hospitable to nonreducitve physicalism. 
"[T]he Old Testament expresses little concern with the question, What 
happens when we die?" (p. 188), and there is no suggestion that the dead 
inhabit Sheol because "some essential part of the human being (whether a 
soul or a spirit, or some other) has survived death" (p. 189). With the onset 
of Second Temple Judaism (fourth century B.C.E.), a dizzying array of posi-
tions about the nature of the human being and the afterlife developed in 
the mix of Greek, Roman, and Jewish thought (p. 190). Though dualism 
was included in the mix, nothing Paul says in his letters entails that he 
was a dualist. Indeed, "Paul affirms a profound continuity between life in 
this world and life everlasting with God, a continuity whose form is bodily 
existence" (p. 192; author's emphasis). Overall, the Bible gives witness to a 
deeply relational view of a human being with others of his own kind, cre-
ation, and God (pp. 94-101, 166, 173, 194, 199-208, 238), and those today 
who find dualism in Scripture "read a Cartesian interest in 'the mind' back 
into the Bible" (p. 184). 
Have the authors made their case for nonreductive physicalism? There 
are three reasons to doubt that they have. First, while a dualist can and 
should affirm the importance of relationships for being human, what is 
at issue between nonreductive physicalists and dualists is not the impor-
tance of those relationships but the nature of what enters into them. Is a 
soul one of the relata? Nothing that the authors of From Cells to Souls-and 
Beyond argue requires a negative answer to this question. Indeed, none 
of them ever mentions the fundamenltal reason why the dualist believes 
this question requires an affirmative answer. This reason concerns the ap-
parent substantial simplicity of the self I am aware of myself not having 
any substantive parts, while I am aware of my physical body (brain) hav-
ing substantive parts. Hence, I am ontologically distinct from my physical 
body (brain). 
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It is because the authors never bring up the issue of the self's substantial 
simplicity that they never mention one of the most fascinating issues in 
contemporary brain science, namely, the binding problem. As the authors 
rightly emphasize, different mental/soul capacities and events (memory, 
emotion, sensation, thought, etc.) are correlated with events that are lo-
calized in different areas of the brain. If we were to make inferences on 
the basis of this information alone, we would conclude that one area of 
the brain remembers, another experiences emotion, another hears, anoth-
er sees, another philosophizes, and so on. This is not, however, what we 
discover from the first-person point of view. From that point of view, I, a 
simple, unified self, simultaneously now remember kissing my daughter this 
morning, experience pleasure along with that memory, hear the rain hit-
ting the window, see the computer screen, feel a throbbing in my right foot, 
and the like. Given this datum, some neuroscientists consider the idea that 
there is a single location in the brain where all of these soul occurrences are 
bound together into a unified whole. Regardless of whether such a spot is 
ever found in the brain, what is important to realize is that neuroscientists 
would not even consider the idea that there might be a physical point in 
the brain that mirrors our first-person experience of ourselves unless they 
took seriously the nature of that experience. What the contributors to From 
Cells to Souls-and Beyond do not tell the reader is that if nonreductive 
physicalism is true, our first-person experiences of ourselves at any pres-
ent moment as substantially simple, unified selves must be illusory. 
In addition to the issue of the nature of our selves at the present moment, 
there is the matter of our identity across or through time. The contributors 
devote a good bit of space to elaborating how neuropathologies can dis-
rupt one's experience of self-identity through time (pp. 78, 81-83, 85, 94). 
For example, Alzheimer's dementia affects one's ability to remember recent 
and past events. What they do not make clear is why we should conclude 
from this that the subject whose capacity to remember is undermined by a 
physical disorder such as Alzheimer's cannot be an enduring soul. 
In light of the authors' failure to address the issue of the simplicity of 
the self, it is important to note that they mischaracterize the justification 
for holding the dualist position. The contributors repeatedly maintain that 
the dualist claim that the soul exists is a postulate to account for human 
experiences that cannot yet be accounted for neurologically or biologically 
(pp. 180, 245). According to the contributors, dualism is a soul-of-the-gaps 
hypothesis much like the god-of-the-gaps hypothesis that is put forth by 
some religious believers (pp. 62, 145). Nothing, however, could be further 
from the truth. The justification for the belief in dualism is footed first and 
foremost in first-person experience. It is not found in the physical world 
and observations of data from the third-person perspective for which du-
alism is believed to be the best explanatory hypothesis. 
The second reason for doubting that the authors have made their case 
for nonreductive physicalism concerns the relationship between the first-
person experience of the self as a simple soul and the anthropological 
views of Scripture. While the authors correctly maintain that the Bible 
does not develop a philosophical anthropology, their claim (pp. 166, 173, 
183-184) that dualists have read a Cartesian interest back into the Bible 
is mistaken. Dualists are simply reading Scripture as an ordinary person 
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reads Scripture, and because both the ordinary first-person view of the 
self is thoroughly dualist in character and Scripture is written for ordinary 
people, it is only natural to assume that Scripture presupposes (and does 
not argue for) the truth of dualism. In this context, it must be emphasized 
that Descartes philosophized about dualism. He did not illvent it. Dualism 
was around long before Descartes and even Plato (who also philosophized 
about, but did not invent, dualism). Thus, the argument that dualism is a 
Greek/Hellenistic idea (p. 190) is bogus. The early church fathers drew 
upon Greek philosophizing about dualism when thinking about matters 
such as the nature of the persons of Godhead, but neither they nor the 
writers of Scripture needed to go to Athens to find dualism. The concept 
of and belief in the soul was also present in such disparate places as In-
dia (e.g., Hinduism), China (e.g., Confucianism), and North America (e.g., 
native American religion). Because dualism arises out of ordinary, first-
person experience, the burden is on anyone who would argue that the 
Bible does not assume dualism. 
The third reason for doubting that the authors make their case for non-
reductive physicalism concerns the issue of bottom-to-top or physical-to-
mental causation. While modern neuroscience has written a more detailed 
story about what goes on in the brain when mentallsoulish events are caus-
ally produced, the augmented details in no way change the substantive 
nature of the story. People have always known that a good knock on the 
head or the ingestion of various natural substances could produce some 
remarkable effects. What modern science has enabled us to do (through 
drugs, electrical probes, etc.) is produce the same, and additional, remark-
able effects while bypassing the knock on the head. Moreover, with the 
aid of sophisticated observational tedmology (MRIs, PET and CAT scans, 
etc.), scientists are now able to observe the disparate brain activities that 
accompany seeing, hearing, dreaming, etc. Why, however, should discov-
ery of the fact that the causal sources of various mentallsoulish effects are 
localized in different areas of the brain, as opposed to the brain as a whole, 
lead us to conclude that dualism is harder to believe than it was before? 
Of course, it is part of the dualist view that the mental/soul-physical re-
lation is not only one-way in nature. Mental events also produce physical 
events, and the dualist concedes that this relationship is just as mysterious 
as that which obtains when physical events produce mental/soul events. 
Nonreductive physicalism, too, acknowledges what it regards as top-to-
bottom causation, and its proponents concede that their view provides no 
greater insights than dualism about mental-to-physical causation. They 
admit that "we are not claiming that we understand how this [mental-to-
physical] interdependence works. Thus far we know of no evidence that 
gives an adequate [nonreductive physicalist] explanation of how cogni-
tion produces changes in brain processes; rather, we can give merely a 
description" (p. 244). Given that nonreductive physicalism, like dualism, 
cannot provide an explanation of how the mental produces changes in the 
brain, one is left puzzled about why dualism should be jettisoned in favor 
or nonreductive physicalism. 
In closing, I emphasize that From Cells to Souls-and Beyond is an ex-
tremely interesting and at times-e.g." when the authors describe the de-
cline of the quality of life of Alzheimer's patients-emotionally moving 
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book. While the contributors have not presented a persuasive argument 
that their view of human nature is superior to and should replace that of 
the dualist, they have certainly succeeded in putting together an informa-
tive collection of essays about the different ways in which contemporary 
science is helping to give us a picture of what goes on in our brains when 
different kinds of events occur in our mental lives. 
From Cells to Souls-and Beyond presents a physicalist view of the hu-
man person in light of developments in contemporary science. In his A 
Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, Hud Hudson presents, as the 
title suggests, a materialistic metaphysical view of the human person. 
Hudson presupposes that human persons are material objects and devel-
ops a materialist account of those persons that "requires some astounding 
revisions in our commonly accepted metaphysics of the human person" 
(2). To motivate his revisionist materialism, Hudson has the reader con-
sider the following puzzle about a man named "Legion": 
Legion, who is sitting in a chair at time T, is composed of material 
simples (the Primary Set). A second set of material simples (the Sec-
ondary Set) exists at T and contains all the material simples in the Pri-
mary Set except an outermost simple (called "Righty") on Legion's 
right hand and one additional material simple (called "Lefty") which 
is located in the vicinity of Legion's left hand. Given the assumption 
(i) that the property of being a person supervenes on the fusion of 
the material simples in a set (a fusion of a set is an object that is com-
posed of the set's members) and facts concerning the environment, 
histories, types, arrangements and intrinsic properties of those ma-
terial simples (what Hudson calls "Person-Composing Conditions" 
(13)), and the additional assumption (ii) that the supervenience of 
the property of being a person is insensitive to an insignificant differ-
ence such as that involving the absence of Righty and the presence of 
Lefty while all the other material simples remain the same, then "we 
have every reason to believe that if the fusion at T of the members of 
[the Primary Set] is a person at T, then the fusion at T of the members 
of [the Secondary Set] is a person at T, as well." (p. 14) 
What Hudson calls "The Problem of the Many" is how to avoid the con-
clusion that there are many persons in the chair when we naturally believe 
that only Legion is present. 
Hudson discusses nine alleged solutions to The Problem of the Many, 
and after dismissing all of them he considers what he calls the "3DPartist" 
(three-dimensional partist) solution. According to 3DPartism, it is a mistake 
to think that a material object has its constitutive (proper) parts intrinsically 
or nonrelationally. Instead, a material object 0 has a part p at (in virtue of its 
relation to) a spatial region r at a time t (p. 46). Hence, the shape of 0 (which 
is a function of the arrangement of its parts) is not an intrinsic feature of it 
but also is had relative to r at t (p. 49). 3DPartism implies not only that a 
material object can be wholly present at more than one time (which is the 
standard Three-Dimensionalist understanding of material objects), but also 
that a material object can exactly occupy and, thereby, be wholly present, 
at more than one region of space at a time (p. 49). Armed with his partism, 
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the 3DPartist solves the Problem of the Many in the following way: there 
is (as one ordinarily believes) only one person, Legion, who is sitting in the 
chair at T. Legion, however, is identical with both the ·fusion of the mate-
rial simples in the Primary Set (Hudson names this fusion "Tweedledee"), 
which occupies one spatial region, and the fusion of the material simples 
in the Secondary Set (Hudson names this fusion "Tweedledum"), which 
occupies a different spatial region (though the regions completely overlap 
except for the space occupied by Righty (which is a part of Tweedledee 
but not Tweedledum) and the space occupied by Lefty (which is a part of 
Tweedledum but not Tweedledee). Given classical identity, Tweedledee is 
identical with Tweedledum. 
Hudson openly admits that the idea that a material object has its parts 
and, thereby, its shape relative to a spatial region (one might think of the 
object inheriting or deriving its parts and shape from a spatial region) 
is counterintuitive (p. 146). Though this is counterintuitive, Hudson be-
lieves it is a different implication of 3DPartism that undermines its truth. 
To draw out this additional implication, Hudson has the reader consider 
the puzzle case of Tibbles the cat (p. 54). At time TI, Tibbles has a tail. 
The proper part of Tibbles excepting her tail is called "Tib". Tibbles and 
Tib are not identical because Tibbles exactly occupies a larger region of 
space than Tib, "and nothing [in this case, Tib] exactly occupies a larger 
region of space than itself" (p. 54). Now, suppose Tibbles loses her tail. 
Tibbles still exists as does Tib, but at post-accident times Tibbles and Tib 
seem to exactly occupy the same region of space. Given that two material 
objects cannot both exactly occupy the same region of space, Tibbles and 
Tib are identical. Thus, Tibbles and Tib both are and are not identical. The 
3DPartist seemingly has a way of solving this problem. Because the very 
same object can simultaneously exactly occupy different regions of space, 
Tib could exactly occupy the same (larger region of) space occupied by 
Tibbles at a time prior to the accident. The trouble now, however, is that if, 
at a pre-accident time TI, Tibbles and Tib are, as the 3DPartist maintains, 
identical, then because Tibbles has Tib as a proper part of herself, Tib has 
herself as a proper part. This, however, is impossible, given the mereologi-
cal principle that no object has itself as a proper part (57). 
To where should the materialist tum? Hudson believes that he should 
tum to Four-Dimensionalism, which rejects the Three-Dimensionalist 
thesis that a material object is wholly present at each of the plurality of 
times at which it exists. According to the Four-Dimensionalist, an object 
is not wholly present at each of the plurality of times at which it exists 
but is spread out in time just as it is in space. Just as a material object has 
spatial parts, so also it has temporal parts. "The principle idea is that nec-
essarily, for each way of exhaustively dividing the lifetime of any object, 
x, into two parts, there is a corresponding way of dividing x itself into 
two parts, each of which is present throughout, but not outside of, the 
corresponding part of x's lifetime" (pp. 58-59). As applied to the case of 
Tibbles and Tib (pp. 68-69), Four-Dimensionalism implies the following: 
The post-accident temporal parts of Tibbles and Tib exactly occupy the 
same region of spacetime and are identical. Prior to the loss of her tail, 
however, Tibbles and Tib exactly occupy distinct regions of spacetime, 
though the second region is a proper sub-region of the first. Thus, while 
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one and the same spacetime part is shared by both Tibbles and Tib, they 
are distinct spacetime worms. 
The case of Tibbles and Tib, however, is not the only problem that must 
be resolved. There is also The Problem of the Many. To solve it, Hudson be-
lieves that Four-Dimensionalism should be supplemented with the partist 
insights from 3DPartism to yield 4DPartism (p. 68). Legion, therefore, is a 
four-dimensional spacetime worm who simultaneously exactly occupies 
and is wholly present at distinct regions of spacetime. With the inclusion 
of partism, however, the 4DPartist, like his 3DPartist counterpart, must 
explain why Tibbles and Tib are not identical. The reason is much the 
same as that given by the 3DPartist: because the spacetime region exactly 
occupied by Tib is a proper subregion of that occupied by Tibbles, and 
no object can have itself as a proper part at a region of spacetime, Tibbles 
and Tib are not identical but are distinct spacetime worms which share a 
spacetime part of post-accident regions (pp. 68-69). 
What is one to make of all of this? Hudson calls one of the possible 
responses to 3DPartism the "This view is nuts" objection (p. 53). "Could 
be," says Hudson, though "[ilt would be good to say exactly why" (p. 
53). Fair enough, though I am sure that Hudson will not find the expla-
nation that I provide the least bit convincing. This is because he says the 
Partist View "provides the best overall fit with [his] pre-philosophical in-
tuitions" (p. 146). Given that my pre-philosophical intuitions are at odds 
with Hudson's, and metaphysics, like philosophy in general, starts with 
fundamental intuitions (one wonders whether the contributors to From 
Cells to Souls-and Beyond would opt for dualism if they believed their 
physicalist view required the truth of 4DPartism), I believe that I cannot 
persuade Hudson that his view is wrong. Nevertheless, because it is pos-
sible (indeed, likely) that a reader will share more basic intuitions with me 
than with Hudson, I will briefly explain why I think his view is nuts. Two 
reasons are most important. 
First, and most basically, and assuming for the sake of discussion that I 
am a material object, the idea that I am four-dimensional spacetime worm 
who is not wholly present at each moment that I exist conflicts with my 
first-person awareness of myself as wholly present at the moment that I 
am typing this sentence. The belief that I am wholly present at the pres-
ent moment, which is grounded in this awareness of myself, is basic, and 
because I cannot envision ever having an awareness of something that 
undermines it (or the more general belief that I am wholly present at any 
moment that I exist), I cannot envision ever giving it up. 
Second, the idea that a material object can simultaneously exactly oc-
cupy and be wholly present at distinct regions of space is counterintuitive 
because seemingly incoherent. While it makes sense to think that material 
objects have proper parts that are present in different spatial regions at the 
same time, material objects themselves cannot be in different spatial regions 
at the same time. Given that a material object is wholly present in a region of 
space only if all of its constituent proper parts are present in that region, the 
claim that a material object which has all of its proper parts in one spatial 
region that it exactly occupies can simultaneously exactly occupy a differ-
ent spatial region seems incoherent. The Partist will remind me that I am 
begging the question against him by assuming that a material object has its 
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proper parts independent of its relationship to a spatial region. It doesn't. A 
material object only has its proper parts relative to a region of space. What 
this entails is that all of its proper parts are located in spatial region R1 in 
virtue of being related to R1 and all of its proper parts are located in region 
R2 in virtue of being related to R2. Perhaps it is because Partism seems so 
absolutely incredible that Hudson suggests that there will have to be U some 
requirement of Significant overlap between the two spatial regions [R1 and 
R2] in question," (p. 50) for otherwise the one and the same material object 
could be simultaneously wholly present in Fenway Park and Wrigley Field. 
Such a requirement, however, seems thoroughly ad hoc in nature and an 
implicit recognition that the Partist claim that material objects have their 
proper parts in virtue of their relationships to spatial regions is nuts. (Inci-
dentally, it is interesting to note that the binding problem mentioned earlier 
seems to be much less of a problem if a version of Partism that does not 
include the requirement of significant overlap of spatial regions is true.) 
The requirement in question, however, does not really explain away the 
incredible nature of Partism. To see why, consider Legion who, because he 
is supposedly identical with Tweedledum and Tweedledee, has the requi-
site significant overlap of spatial regions and, thereby, a significant overlap 
in proper parts relative to that overlap. Because of Legion's identity with 
Tweedledee and Tweedledum, however, it also is the case that he simul-
taneously has Righty relative to a spatial region R1 and Lefty relative to a 
different spatial region R2. It follows, then, that Legion simultaneously has 
one shape in relation to R1 and a barely discernible though nevertheless 
genuinely different shape in relation to R2. If, instead of one Righty and 
one Lefty, there were several billion of each arranged in the right ways, 
Legion would end up simultaneously having an oval shape relative to R1 
and an oblong shape relative to R2. Is that credible? 
Finally, one might wonder about the metaphysical status of spatial re-
gions themselves. Are they comprised of atomic spatial points? Do they 
have their shapes intrinsically? If so, why do they have these metaphysi-
cal advantages over material objects? If they do not have such metaphysi-
cal advantages, is their ontological status also relational in nature? If so, 
in relation to what? Material objects? A problem of circularity now rears 
its head. 
Though Partism seems nuts to me for the reasons just given, there is a 
view in the ballpark that is similar to 3DPartism and, I think, much more 
plausible. The price of admission, however, requires abandoning material-
ism and endorsing dualism. In other words, while a person has a material 
body, he is not identical with it. The view I have in mind is non-Cartesian 
and more medieval in nature. It was even endorsed by Kant and is the 
idea that a person is a metaphysically simple soul who is wholly present 
at each point in space that is occupied by his three-dimensional physi-
cal body (that has its parts intrinsically). Like 3DPartism, then, this form 
of dualism maintains that a person can simultaneously occupy distinct 
regions of space. Unlike 3DPartism, however, this form of dualism holds 
that a soul has no substantive proper parts. Hence, it avoids the nutty 
claims that go with 3DPartism. 
Hudson considers dualism as a possible solution to The Problem of the 
Many (pp. 19-21). He thinks dualism is not only nutty but also claims that 
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it does not solve The Problem of the Many. It fails to solve The Problem 
because it asserts that a soul is (causally) related to a human body. Which 
human body, however? Tweedledee or Tweedledum? At this point, I think 
it is fair to point out that The Problem of the Many is a problem given 
a limited, naturalist ontology. If from the outset a metaphysician limits 
himself to sets of material simples, fusions of them, and relational Person-
Composing Conditions, then The Problem of the Many can lead to some 
pretty nutty positions. Might not such a limitation and the fact that it leads 
to a development of a view like 4DPartism constitute a reductio argument 
against the materialist view of the human person? If one were to allow 
for the existence of a soul, form, or some other unifying principle for or-
ganisms, then The Problem of the Many simply would not be a problem. 
Legion's body would be identical with Tweedledee and not Tweedledum 
because Righty, and not Lefty, would be under the influence of the relevant 
unifying principle. Hudson's refusal to acknowledge the existence of such 
a unifying principle is itself puzzling given his willingness to countenance 
the existence of God. After all, God typically unifies various aspects of the 
universe. Thus, because God creates and sustains the universe in being, 
He guides its history and that of the human persons who dwell on the 
face of the earth. Moreover, because God is just, He guarantees that each 
person receives his proper reward and punishment. If one allows such a 
being into one's ontology, is it all that implausible to think that it or some-
thing else could be the unifying principle for a human body? 
In closing, I want to correct what might be a somewhat negative im-
pression of Hudson's book and make clear that A Materialist Metaphysics of 
the Human Person is an absolutely wonderful work. The mark of a truly fan-
tastic book is not whether one agrees with it. It is whether one learns from 
it and either now understands things that one never understood before or 
understands them in a wholly clearer light. This book has that mark, and 
I would be nuts if I did not recommend it enthusiastically. Though you 
might not be nuts for not reading it, you will certainly be intellectually 
worse off.l 
NOTE 
1. I want to thank J. P. Moreland and Dean Zimmerman for reading parts 
of this review. 
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